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Background. Recent evidence suggests that hospital transmission of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is un-
common in UK centers that have implemented sustained infection control programs. We investigated whether a healthcare-network 
analysis could shed light on transmission paths currently sustaining MRSA levels in UK hospitals.
Methods. A cross-sectional observational study was performed in 2 National Health Service hospital groups and a general 
district hospital in Southeast London. All MRSA patients identified at inpatient, outpatient, and community settings between 1 
November 2011 and 29 February 2012 were included. We identified genetically defined MRSA transmission clusters in individual 
hospitals and across the healthcare network, and examined genetic differentiation of sequence type (ST) 22 MRSA isolates within 
and between hospitals and inpatient or outpatient and community settings, as informed by average and median pairwise single-nu-
cleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) and SNP-based proportions of nearly identical isolates.
Results. Two hundred forty-eight of 610 (40.7%) MRSA patients were linked in 90 transmission clusters, of which 27 spanned 
multiple hospitals. Analysis of a large 32 patient ST22-MRSA cluster showed that 26 of 32 patients (81.3%) had multiple contacts 
with one another during ward stays at any hospital. No residential, outpatient, or significant community healthcare contacts were 
identified. Genetic differentiation between ST22 MRSA inpatient isolates from different hospitals was less than between inpatient 
isolates from the same hospitals (P ≤ .01).
Conclusions. There is evidence of frequent ward-based transmission of MRSA brought about by frequent patient admissions to 
multiple hospitals. Limiting in-ward transmission requires sharing of MRSA status data between hospitals.
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Infection prevention and control efforts have resulted in many 
countries reporting large reductions in endemic methicillin- 
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) [1, 2]. In England, this 
reduction has been achieved through a single-hospital-centric 
approach to epidemiology, prevention, and control [2].
Recent evidence suggests limited within-hospital transmis-
sion of S. aureus based on genetic relatedness of inpatient iso-
lates [3–5]. However, there is also evidence that frequent patient 
admissions to multiple hospitals in a network results in regional 
spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria, including MRSA [6–13]. 
In one US study, MRSA genetic relatedness in patients at differ-
ent hospitals correlated with the percentage of patient sharing 
between those hospitals [9]. This suggests there may be bene-
fit in moving from a single-hospital to a healthcare-network 
approach to surveillance and implementation of infection pre-
vention and control measures, to gain further reductions in 
MRSA [14, 15]. However, further information is required to 
inform the establishment of healthcare-network interventions.
We analyzed a collection of MRSA isolates and linked meta-
data from patients attending a network of linked hospitals and 
surrounding primary healthcare facilities in Southeast London 
at a time when mandatory universal MRSA admission screening 
was in place. All hospitals had reported sustained stable control 
of MRSA over at least the preceding 5 years, in line with national 
trends [2]. The objective was to identify whether and where 
MRSA transmission was occurring by taking a healthcare-net-
work rather than single-hospital approach to surveillance.
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METHODS
Study Population
A description of the study population has been reported pre-
viously [16, 17]. All MRSA isolates identified over 4 months 
(November 2011 to February 2012) were collected from 3 
National Health Service (NHS) hospital microbiology labora-
tories collectively serving a population of 867 254 usual resi-
dents [18] and providing service to all inpatients, outpatients, 
and surrounding primary community-based healthcare facili-
ties (ie, general practices [GPs]) in Lambeth, Southwark, and 
Lewisham boroughs of Southeast London. Participating centers 
comprised 4 acute tertiary-referral hospitals in 2 NHS hospital 
groups (Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Foundation Trust [GSTT; 
hospital A] and King’s College NHS Foundation Trust [hos-
pital B]) plus 1 acute District General Hospital (University 
Hospital Lewisham [hospital C]). Hospital A (GSTT) com-
prises St Thomas’ Hospital, Guy’s Hospital, and the London 
Evelina Children’s Hospital (Figure 1A). Patient transfers and 
referrals between participant hospitals are common, and the 
hospitals’ overlapping catchment areas mean that local usual 
residents may be admitted to any hospital without referral. A 
system for sharing clinical patient details between healthcare 
facilities was not available at the time of the study, implying 
that history of MRSA from other facilities was not obviously 
available for patients admitted without referral. All acute ter-
tiary-referral sites regularly provide services to international 
patients and those from other London boroughs and sites in 
the United Kingdom, which are not discharged back into the 
catchment areas of the hospital cohort. All participant hospitals 
had in place MRSA universal admission screening plus weekly 
follow-up screening for inpatients in high-risk units at the time 
of the study.
Laboratory Methods
Isolates from participant hospitals were submitted to the 
Centre for Clinical Infection and Diagnostics Research at 
GSTT for an independent identity check and included in 
the study if confirmed as MRSA by culture on chromogenic 
agar (Oxoid Brilliance) and rapid latex agglutination test 
(Staphaurex, Remel) [16, 17]. Relevant patient-level metadata 
Figure 1. Map of hospitals and distribution of 90 genetically defined transmission clusters across services in the hospital cohort. A, Upper right corner shows a map of 
London, with the catchment area boroughs served by participant hospitals shaded in pink (Southwark, Lambeth, and Lewisham). Hospital A (Guy’s and St Thomas’ National 
Health Service [NHS] Foundation Trust) comprises 3 hospitals, just south of the river Thames. Hospital B corresponds to King’s College NHS Foundation Trust, and comprises 1 
hospital. Hospital C comprises University Hospital Lewisham, which is now part of the Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust. B, The 9 concentric circles represent healthcare 
settings (ie, inpatient; outpatient; community) for hospitals A (orange), B (blue), and C (green). The 90 transmission clusters are represented by a segment. The number of 
unique patients in the cluster is shown by a bar. Red and white bars correspond to transmission clusters of sequence type (ST) 22 and other STs, respectively. For each cluster, 
the location of patients in the cluster at the time of sampling is shown in blue. For example, 32 patients in the largest cluster where identified across 7 of 9 hospital settings. 
Twenty-nine of 90 transmission clusters (32.2%) occurred within a single hospital setting. Sixty-one clusters (67.8%) involved >1 setting in either a single hospital (n = 34 
[37.8%]; median = 2 settings) or in multiple hospitals (n = 27 [30.0%]; median = 2 hospitals). Abbreviation: ST, sequence type.
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submitted with each specimen included the patient’s resi-
dential postcode, the identifier and postcode of the general 
practice routinely providing primary care to the patient, and 
the postcode and unique identifier of the clinical location 
managing the patient at the time of sampling. Clinical loca-
tion data were aggregated for analysis into settings (defined 
as inpatient, outpatient, or community) linked to each par-
ticipant hospital. Using GeoConvert [19], postcode data were 
converted to lower super output areas (LSOAs) for analysis. 
LSOAs are boundary data for small geographies, which com-
prise 1500 residents and 650 households on average [18].
Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) was conducted at 
Illumina UK on the first confirmed MRSA isolate from each 
patient at each unique clinical location over the study period as 
described previously [16, 17].
Analysis of WGS Data
Sequence data were mapped to the EMRSA-15 reference genome 
MRSA252 (GenBank accession number BX571856, ST36) using 
BWA mem [20] in agreement with standard practice [21]. 
Application of SAMtools software suite [22] identified 152 797 
high-quality single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) positions 
(quality score ≥30; 1 error/1000 base pairs). SNP genotypes 
(alleles) were called based on a minimum 10-fold allelic cover-
age or considered missing [23]. SNPs in non-unique genomic 
regions were removed. Additional filtering based on missing 
genotypes was applied to both SNPs and samples, leading to a 
final analysis dataset and 68 997 (45.2%) high-quality SNP loci 
per sample. The proportion of missing genotypes across the data-
set was low (0.1%). The SNPs covered the core MRSA genome 
[24] (≥1 SNP in 2099 of 2744 genes), with the majority located 
in genic regions (87.7%). Thirty-nine percent of mutations were 
nonsynonymous. To describe local MRSA phylogenies and clade 
informative variation, SNP data were used to create best-scor-
ing maximum likelihood phylogenic trees using RAxML, with 
default settings and 1000 bootstrap samples [25].
To determine the sequence-typing classification of each iso-
late, draft genome assemblies were compared to custom BLAST 
databases for each of the pubMLST multilocus sequence typing 
(MLST) alleles. Allele BLAST outputs were filtered to identify 
sequences with 100% identity across the entire allele length, 
and the sequence type (ST) was determined using the combin-
ation of alleles. To identify staphylococcal cassette chromosome 
mec (SCCmec), reference BLAST databases of ccr and mec gene 
complexes were constructed from known sccMEC types (acces-
sion numbers AB033763, AB037671, AB063172, AB063173, 
AB096217, AB097677, AB121219, AB373032, AB425823, 
AB425824, AB505628, AB505630, AF411935, D86934, 
DQ106887, FJ670542). Draft assemblies were compared to 
the BLAST databases and outputs were filtered to determine 
the ccr and mec complexes. Unusual ccr and mec complexes or 
absent/poor data were confirmed by mapping raw sequence 
data against SCCmec references and visually inspecting each 
alignment. SCCmec types were determined using International 
Working Group on the Staphylococcal Cassette Chromosome 
elements definitions (http://www.sccmec.org/Pages/SCC_
TypesEN.html).
Genetically Defined Clusters
Clusters were identified based on pairwise SNP differences be-
tween isolates without prior knowledge of patient location or 
epidemiological linkages. The SNP cutoff to define clusters 
(≤10 SNP) was based on the observed multimodal distribu-
tions of inter- and intraperson SNP differences (Supplementary 
Figure 1 and Supplementary Table 1) and the numbers of clus-
ters and cluster sizes identified when considering 0, ≤5, 10, 15, 
or 20 SNP cutoffs, which showed the number of clusters peaking 
at ≤10 SNP (Supplementary Table 2). The frequency of patient-
to-patient transmission events within the study population was 
inferred by counting the number of unique patients in each pos-
sible transmission cluster (eg, 2 transmission events inferred 
from a cluster of 3 patients). The total number of patients linked 
to transmission was calculated by de-duplicating patients repre-
sented in >1 cluster. We compared numbers and sizes of clusters 
and numbers of patients linked to transmission when restrict-
ing the analysis to individual hospitals in isolation compared 
with considering all healthcare settings combined.
Epidemiological Linkage of Patients in Clusters
When considering all healthcare settings combined, we exam-
ined whether patients in the largest cluster could be linked 
by their residential LSOA or by routinely attending the same 
community-based general practice, having attended the same 
outpatient clinic at the same time during the study period or 
the preceding 12  months, or having stayed in the same in-
patient ward across any of the 3 hospitals at the same time 
or within 7 days of each other during the study period or the 
preceding 12 months. We allowed this 7-day gap to account 
for indirect transmission via a staff carrier or contaminated 
surface [3].
Genetic Differentiation of MRSA
We calculated the proportion of nearly identical ST22 iso-
lates (I) from patients living within the catchment area [7] to 
compare genetic differentiation of MRSA within and between 
hospitals and community settings [7]. For robustness, “I” was 
determined by the proportion of isolate pairs with ≤10, 20, 
30, or 40 SNPs because various thresholds have been used to 
discount direct transmission [3, 24]. We further validated the 
transmission dynamics inferred from “I,” by comparing average 
and median pairwise SNP differences (π) across isolates within 
and between hospital inpatient settings and surrounding com-
munities [7]. The statistical significance of genetic differenti-
ation of MRSA populations was assessed through permutation 
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tests over 10 000 random permutations of clinical location iden-
tifiers relative to the list of isolates [7].
WGS data are available from the European Nucleotide 
Archive database under accession number PRJEB11177 
[17]. Patient-level metadata are available from the corre-
sponding author.
Ethical Considerations
This research was conducted following approval from the 
National Research Ethics Service (reference: 11/NW/0733). 
Approval and waived consent was obtained from NHS re-
search and development departments at participating 
hospitals.
RESULTS
Study Demographics
A total of 68 997 high-quality genome-wide SNPs were analyzed 
for 685 isolates from 610 patients, of which 56.1% (n = 342) were 
usual residents of the cohort boroughs (Figure 1A). Review of 
each hospital’s own records identified 48.2% (n = 293) of patients 
having been admitted to that hospital during the 12  months 
preceding their enrollment in the study, 38.2% (n = 233) hav-
ing previously been identified with MRSA, and 20.3% (n = 124) 
having their first MRSA identification within the year preced-
ing their enrollment (Table 1).
Most patients (542 [88.9%]) contributed a single sequenced 
isolate, but 11.1% (n = 68) contributed more (maximum of 3). 
Five hundred twenty-three (85.7%) patients had MRSA-positive 
healthcare episodes in a single setting (inpatient: 47.0%; out-
patient: 27.2%; community: 11.5%). Most isolates (352 [51.4%]) 
were from inpatients (Table 2).
MRSA MLST and Population Phylogeny
MLST identified 31 STs, with more than half of isolates being 
ST22 (n  =  408 [59.6%]), followed by ST36 (n  =  68 [9.9%]) 
and ST8 (n  =  38 [5.5%]). Fifteen novel STs were identi-
fied from 22 isolates (3.2%), of which 14 of 15 deviated by 
single SNP variants from known STs (predominantly ST22s). 
A  SNP phylogenetic tree clustered all STs into 3 clades 
(Supplementary Figure 2).
Table 1.  Characteristics of Patients With Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus
Characteristic Hospital A (n = 256) Hospital B (n = 251) Hospital C (n = 103) Total (N = 610)
Age, y, mean (SD) 54.4 (25.5) 58.5 (23.1) 69.3 (19.4) 58.6 (24.1)
Age group
 ≤14 y 9.4 (24) 5.2 (13) 1.0 (1) 6.2 (38)
 ≥65 y 41.4 (106) 43.8 (110) 66.0 (68) 46.6 (284)
Sex, female 41.0 (105) 37.5 (94) 51.5 (53) 41.3 (252)
Residential LSOA within catchment boroughs 48.4 (124) 55.0 (138) 77.7 (80) 56.1 (342)
>1 healthcare episode during the study 24.2 (62) 23.5 (59) 17.5 (18) 22.8 (139)
Isolates with sequence data per patienta
 1 89.5 (229) 87.6 (220) 90.3 (93) 88.9 (542)
 2 8.6 (22) 11.6 (29) 9.7 (10) 10.0 (61)
 3 2.0 (5) 0.8 (2) 0.0 (0) 1.1 (7)
Type of healthcare episode
 Inpatient only 54.3 (139) 51 (128) 19.4 (20) 47.0 (287)
 Outpatient only 21.5 (55) 27.5 (69) 40.8 (42) 27.2 (166)
 Community only 7.8 (20) 8.8 (22) 27.2 (28) 11.5 (70)
 Mixed 16.4 (42) 12.7 (32) 12.6 (13) 14.3 (87)
Had previous history of MRSA 32.8 (84) 43.4 (109) 38.8 (40) 38.2 (233)
Time to first MRSA diagnosis
 ≤1 y 18.4 (47) 24.3 (61) 15.5 (16) 20.3 (124)
 >1–5 y 8.6 (22) 12.4 (31) 16.5 (17) 11.5 (70)
 >5 y 5.9 (15) 6.8 (17) 6.8 (7) 6.4 (39)
Had previous admission to hospital 63.7 (163) 65.3 (164) 68.3 (69)b 65.1 (396)b
Time to previous admission
 ≤1 y 52.3 (134) 47.8 (120) 38.6 (39)b 48.2 (293)b
 >1–5 y 5.9 (15) 12.4 (31) 16.8 (17)b 10.4 (63)b
 >5 y 5.5 (14) 5.2 (13) 12.9 (13)b 6.6 (40)b
Data are presented as percentage (No.) unless otherwise indicated.
Abbreviations: LSOA, lower super output area; MRSA, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; SD, standard deviation. 
aFifty-four patients had isolates sequenced in multiple settings (43 [inpatient and outpatient]; 5 [inpatient and community]; 5 [outpatient and community]; 1 [inpatient, outpatient, and 
community]) and 20 had (instead or in addition) >1 isolate (maximum 2) sequenced within the same hospital setting. 
bInformation on previous admission to hospital was missing for 2 patients in hospital C. Hospital C and total denominators were therefore 101 and 608, respectively.
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Clusters in Single and Multiple Hospital Settings
Linking isolates based on ≤10 SNP difference identified 90 
clusters involving ≥2 patients that formed possible transmis-
sion chains (Figure 1B); of these, 61.1% (n = 55) involved 2 
patients, whereas the remaining clusters involved 3 (n  =  21 
[23.3%]), 4 (n  =  9 [10.0%]), 5 (n  =  4 [4.4%]), or 32 (n  =  1 
[1.1%]) patients (Table 2). The majority of transmission clus-
ters involved individuals in inpatient wards (n = 70 [77.8%]), 
with most (n = 61 [67.8%]) spanning multiple settings within 
a hospital (n  =  34 [37.8%]) or across >1 hospital (n  =  27 
[30.0%]) (Figure 1B).
The largest cluster comprised 32 patients with ST22-MRSA 
identified at hospitals A  (n = 4), B (n = 12), and C (n = 16), 
spanning 7 of the 9 settings in the cohort (Figures 1B and 2A).
Over the 4-month period, 40.7% of patients (248/610) could 
be linked to 1 of at least 171 possible transmission events 
(Table 2). Confining analysis to each hospital setting separately 
missed 40.4% (69/171) of possible transmission events and 
35.1% (87/248) of patients linked to transmission across the 
hospital network (Table 2).
Epidemiological Linkage Within and Between Hospital Settings of Patients 
in the Large ST22 Transmission Cluster
Data on inpatient and outpatient contact during the preceding 
year, residential postcode, and community healthcare provider 
were obtained from the 32-patient ST22 cluster to identity the 
likely setting of MRSA transmission. First, patient data were 
analyzed separately from each hospital, which epidemiologi-
cally linked only 9 patients (2, 3, and 4 inpatients from hospitals 
A, B, and C, respectively) based on criteria outlined earlier. This 
would indicate ≤3 inpatient transmission events at any hospital 
(total 6) and the likely conclusion that in-hospital transmission 
Table 2. Numbers of Isolates, Genetically Defined Clusters, Inferred Transmission Events, and Patients Linked to Transmission Events by Methicillin-
Resistant Staphylococcus aureus Multilocus Sequence Type
 Total ST22 ST36 ST8 ST5 ST1 ST88 Other ST
Isolates
 Total 100 (685) 59.6 (408) 9.9 (68) 5.5 (38) 3.6 (25) 3.5 (24) 2.3 (16) 15.5 (106)
 Inpatient settings 51.4 (352) 52.7 (215) 67.6 (46) 52.6 (20) 32.0 (8) 37.5 (9) 50 (8) 43.4 (46)
  Hospital A 48.6 (171) 57.9 (99) 9.9 (17) 10.5 (18) 2.9 (5) 4.1 (7) 0.6 (1) 14.0 (24)
  Hospital B 42.9 (151) 61.6 (93) 17.9 (27) 1.3 (2) 2.0 (3) 1.3 (2) 4.6 (7) 11.3 (17)
  Hospital C 8.5 (30) 76.7 (23) 6.7 (2)
 Outpatient settings 35.5 (243) 34.6 (141) 26.5 (18) 34.2 (13) 52.0 (13) 37.5 (9) 37.5 (6) 40.6 (43)
  Hospital A 35.8 (87) 46.0 (40) 4.6 (4) 9.2 (8) 6.9 (6) 5.7 (5) 3.4 (3) 24.1 (21)
  Hospital B 42.8 (104) 56.7 (59) 12.5 (13) 3.8 (4) 3.8 (4) 3.8 (4) 2.9 (3) 16.3 (17)
  Hospital C 21.4 (52) 80.8 (42) 1.9 (1) 1.9 (1) 5.8 (3) 9.6 (5)
 Community settings 13.1 (90) 12.7 (52) 5.9 (4) 13.2 (5) 16.0 (4) 25.0 (6) 12.5 (2) 16 (17)
  Hospital A 33.3 (30) 56.7 (17) 10.0 (3) 6.7 (2) 6.7 (2) 3.3 (1) 16.7 (5)
  Hospital B 32.2 (29) 48.3 (14) 3.4 (1) 6.9 (2) 6.9 (2) 6.9 (2) 27.6 (8)
  Hospital C 34.4 (31) 67.7 (21) 3.2 (1) 6.5 (2) 6.5 (2) 3.2 (1) 12.9 (4)
Clusters (≤10 SNPs)
 Isolate clusters (> 1 isolate) 100 (115) 60.0 (69) 13.0 (15) 4.3 (5) 3.5 (4) 3.5 (4) 3.5 (4) 12.2 (14)
 Patient clusters (> 1 patient) 78.3 (90) 60.0 (54) 14.4 (13) 4.4 (4) 4.4 (4) 2.2 (2) 3.3 (3) 11.1 (10)
 Isolates in patient clusters 41.9 (287) 64.8 (186) 12.9 (37) 4.2 (12) 3.8 (11) 1.4 (4) 2.4 (7) 10.5 (30)
Size of transmission clusters
 2 patients 61.1 (55) 56.4 (31) 14.5 (8) 5.5 (3) 5.5 (3) 3.6 (2) 3.6 (2) 10.9 (6)
 3 patients 23.3 (21) 57.1 (12) 14.3 (3) 4.8 (1) 4.8 (1) 4.8 (1) 14.3 (3)
 4 patients 10.0 (9) 88.9 (8) 11.1 (1)
 5 patients 4.4 (4) 50.0 (2) 25.0 (1) 25 (1)
 32 patients 1.1 (1) 100 (1)
Transmission eventsa
 Within hospital settings (Σ) 102 67.6 (69) 15.7 (16) 2.9 (3) 2.0 (2) 1.0 (1) 3.9 (4) 6.9 (7)
 Within and between hospital settings (Σ) 171 69.0 (118) 12.3 (21) 2.9 (5) 2.9 (5) 1.2 (2) 2.3 (4) 9.4 (16)
Patients linked to transmission eventsb
 Within hospital settings (Σ) 26.4 (161) 67.1 (108) 15.5 (25) 3.1 (5) 2.5 (4) 1.2 (2) 4.3 (7) 8.1 (13)
 Within and between hospital settings (Σ) 40.7 (248) 66.9 (166) 13.7 (34) 3.6 (9) 3.6 (9) 1.6 (4) 2.8 (7) 10.5 (26)
Data are presented as percentage (No.) unless otherwise indicated.
Abbreviations: SNP, single-nucleotide polymorphisms; ST, sequence type.
aPatient-to-patient transmission events were inferred from counting the number of unique patients in each cluster (eg, 2 transmission events inferred from a cluster with 3 patients). The 
same cluster may have been composed of >3 isolates, if any of the patients had >1 isolate in the cluster. 
bNumbers of patients linked to transmission events were calculated by de-duplicating patients represented in >1 cluster. Total percentages for isolates in transmission clusters and patients 
linked to transmission events are based on 685 isolates and 610 patients, respectively.
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was uncommon (Figure 2B). However, combining the analysis 
across all settings in the network, a complex pattern of frequent 
hospital stay emerged, which showed that 26 of 32 patients 
(81.3%) had multiple contacts with one another during ward 
stays at any hospital (Figure 2C). No outpatient contacts were 
identified, no 2 individuals shared the same residential LSOA 
and no more than 2 shared the same GP registration, suggesting 
that transmission occurred on hospital wards.
Genetic Differentiation of ST22 MRSA Within and Between Hospital 
Inpatient Settings
To understand the impact of patient sharing between hospitals 
on in-hospital transmission, we analyzed the genetic differenti-
ation of ST22 MRSA within and between hospital inpatient set-
tings. We considered only isolates from patients with residential 
LSOA within the catchment boroughs (n = 230/408 ST22 iso-
lates) to avoid bias arising from nonlocal patients accessing in-
patient or outpatient care but not primary care in the area and 
being less likely to be admitted to >1 hospital locally.
Median and average pairwise SNP differences between iso-
lates from inpatient settings across the cohort were signifi-
cantly smaller than those from community and outpatient 
settings combined (mean: 63 vs 72, P = .0001; median = 60 vs 
64, P = .0001) (Figure 3B). The proportions of nearly identical 
isolates were also consistently higher among inpatient isolates 
at ≤10, 20, 30, and 40 SNPs (2.9% vs 1.7%, P = .0001; 11.0% vs 
9.5%, P  =  .0026; 20.3% vs 17.1%, P  =  .0001; 25.9% vs 22.0%, 
P = .0001) (Figure 3A).
The average and median pairwise genetic distance between 
inpatient isolates from the same hospitals was significantly 
larger than between isolates from different hospitals (mean: 66 
vs 61, P =  .0003; median = 62 vs 59, P =  .0001) (Figure 3D). 
Figure  2. Transmission cluster of genetically related sequence type (ST) 22 
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA): combined analysis of sin-
gle-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) and epidemiological data from single-hospital 
inpatient settings compared with analysis of data across the healthcare network. 
A, SNP phylogeny for the larger ST22 transmission cluster, which comprised 35 
isolates from 32 patients in hospitals A (n = 4), B (n = 12), and C (n = 16). Numbers 
refer to patient identifiers. The SNP phylogeny identified 6 identical isolates from 
hospitals B (n = 4) and C (n = 2), 7 isolates from hospital B within 1 SNP of each 
other and the central core, and an additional 22 isolates (predominantly from hos-
pital C) no more than 10 SNPs different from each other and from the central core. 
These 22 isolates included 2 pairs of unique-patient isolates from hospitals A and 
C (patients 1 and 21; patients 30 and 26), which differed by 5 SNPs from the core. 
Same-patient isolates were taken from 1 individual in hospital B (patient 7), while 
moving between inpatient and outpatient settings. Two additional repeat isolates 
were from 1 inpatient in hospital C (patient 27). The phylogeny identifies trans-
mission across settings in the cohort based on relatedness of isolates alone. For 
example, 2 identical isolates from hospital A  (inpatient 1)  and C (outpatient 21)   
were related to central core isolates by outpatient 20 in hospital C. Diagrams in B 
and C show inpatient-ward contacts between patients in the larger transmission 
cluster. B, A case where each hospital analysis combined SNP and ward-stay data 
from their own inpatient setting alone. C, Contacts identified when the analysis 
considers all settings and hospitals combined. Patients are represented by a seg-
ment and identified with the same number as that shown in the SNP phylogeny. 
Individuals who were admitted to the same ward during the study period or the 
preceding 12 months are linked to one another through a band, the transparency of 
which indicates the timing of the contact (ie, < transparent: in the same ward at the 
same time; > transparent: in the same ward within a week of each other). Bands 
that are the same color as the hospital segment indicate contacts between patients 
identified by that hospital that occurred in wards at that same hospital. Red bands 
show contacts between patients from different hospitals, who were found to have 
stayed in the same ward as a result of patient transfers or referrals. Admission of 
4 individuals from hospital A (patient 1 and 2) and B (patient 7 and 15) to hospital 
C (bottom diagram) facilitated at least 46 in-ward contacts among the 32 patients 
across the 3 hospitals. Two of 6 patients without contacts (bottom diagram) were 
babies whose mothers’ history was not traced. Analyses limited to inpatients from 
each hospital separately identified half of MRSA acquisitions (17 inpatients of 32 
patients [53.1%]), 13.0% of ward-stay contacts (6/46), and 19.4% (n  =  6/31) of 
unique patient-to-patient transmission events in the cluster. Abbreviation: SNP, 
single-nucleotide polymorphism.
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Proportions of nearly identical isolates at the ≤10 SNPs cutoff 
were similar (2.8% vs 2.9%, P  =  .8743), but those at ≤20, 30, 
and 40 SNPs were significantly higher for isolates from different 
hospitals (9.7% vs 12.0%, P = .011; 18.5% vs 21.3%, P = .0101; 
23.1% vs 27.5%, P = .0002) (Figure 3C). The results of the anal-
yses were consistent with those considering only the first isolate 
from each patient across the healthcare network.
DISCUSSION
This study found compelling evidence for ward-based MRSA 
transmission linked to patient sharing across a network of hos-
pitals, each of which had implemented a successful infection 
control program over many years and seen rates fall by >90% 
from their peak. Confining analysis to each hospital setting sep-
arately missed 40.4% (69/171) of possible transmission events 
across the hospital network. Analysis of inpatient data from each 
hospital separately would not have reached the same conclusion, 
because many of the linked patients were only identified by sam-
ples obtained when they contacted other hospitals or commu-
nity healthcare facilities. This was highlighted through analysis 
of the 32-patient ST22 cluster. Separate analysis of each hospi-
tal’s inpatient-obtained samples would have identified only 9 of 
32 (28%) patients linked to possible transmission events based 
on epidemiological and genetic observations. But when hospi-
tal-stay records from the 32 patients were considered together 
across all participating hospitals and settings, a complex network 
of ward contacts was revealed linking 26 of 32 (81.3%) patients 
and therefore implicating the ward as the location of transmis-
sion. Notably, none had outpatient contact or could be linked by 
residential LSOA and no more than 2 shared the same GP. This 
is significant because it indicates that current endemic levels are 
explained by recent transmission on hospital wards that may be 
missed by a single hospital-centric view, and not elsewhere as 
has been implied by other studies [3–5]. A comparison of SNP 
differences between ST22 isolates from outpatient and commu-
nity settings and inpatients at the same or at different hospitals 
provides further evidence of ward-based transmission linked to 
patient sharing between hospitals. This analysis identified less 
genetic differentiation between inpatient isolates from different 
hospitals than from a same hospital.
Figure 3. A–D, Nearly identical isolates and average pairwise single-nucleotide polymorphisms for sequence type 22 isolates from usual residents in inpatient settings 
within a same hospital or different hospitals and in community or outpatient settings. Abbreviation: SNP, single-nucleotide polymorphism.
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One explanation for these findings may be that once MRSA 
patients are identified at a particular hospital, that information 
is recorded on paper and electronic notes enabling immediate 
implementation of MRSA care pathways locally (contact precau-
tions, isolation, and decolonization) for subsequent admissions; 
however, only elective admissions and interhospital transfers 
take place with communication of MRSA status between hospi-
tals. Individuals with MRSA may remain colonized for months 
or years [26, 27], and test positive even after initial negative 
screens following decolonization/suppression therapy [28–30]. 
Thus, a MRSA patient admitted to a second hospital as an emer-
gency would not implement measures immediately on admis-
sion if MRSA was under the detection limit and no previous 
history was documented on site. The risk of direct (patient-to-
patient) or indirect transmission would therefore be greater in 
the second hospital. Patient sharing between hospitals in the 
absence of equitable sharing of relevant patient data is the most 
likely explanation for our findings, consistent with observations 
made in other studies [6–13, 31].
It is important to consider the practical implications of these 
findings for infection control practice. One simple measure 
would be for all hospitals in a healthcare network to share data 
on patient colonization with MRSA and potentially other anti-
microbial-resistant bacteria, a measure that has been imple-
mented in some settings [32, 33]. This would allow a MRSA care 
pathway to be appropriately implemented during emergency 
admissions. More complex measures such as introduction 
of discharge screening and WGS services to specifically track 
transmission would require more data to identify cost-ben-
efits. Indeed, current national policy is to streamline manda-
tory universal admission screening back to high-risk units only 
or patients previously known to be MRSA positive [34]; thus, 
fewer cases will be identified and this will compromise the ef-
fectiveness of all targeted measures—the consequences of which 
remain to be seen.
Strengths include that the laboratories served the vast 
majority of the population across a healthcare community, 
universal admission screening was performed at each hos-
pital, and we combined a population-based approach with 
fine detail of individual patient-ward stays across a hospital 
network. Limitations include uncertainty over the appropri-
ateness of an SNP cutoff to define transmission [35] and the 
use of a single patient isolate, which hinders the accurate 
reconstruction of transmission networks [36]. However, our 
study was concerned with documenting possible transmis-
sion clusters and population-level genetic differentiation 
and, at this group level, the impact of within-patient genetic 
diversity is less important [36]. Inferences on transmission 
events is limited by the short observation period (4 months), 
the fact that there was no hospital discharge screening, and 
that we could only analyze discharged patients who returned 
to a healthcare facility.
Despite successful hospital infection prevention and control 
programs, our study identified continued ward-based MRSA 
transmission related to patient sharing between hospitals that 
underpins a significant proportion of current endemic trans-
mission. We provide evidence that this is due to patients being 
admitted to multiple hospitals without a process for effective 
communication of colonization status, an issue that might be 
relevant for many antimicrobial-resistant pathogens. We suggest 
that a simple intervention of communicating colonization status 
across hospitals in a network would potentially limit this trans-
mission although, like all targeted measures, this depends on 
maintaining an effective screening program for identification.
Supplementary Data
Supplementary materials are available at Clinical Infectious Diseases online. 
Consisting of data provided by the authors to benefit the reader, the posted 
materials are not copyedited and are the sole responsibility of the authors, 
so questions or comments should be addressed to the corresponding author.
Notes
Author contributions. J. D. E., O. T. A., J. B., and T. G. C. conceived and 
designed the study. J. B., A. I., M. G., R. A. S., J. A. O., and H. M. conducted 
the laboratory analysis, sample preparation, and sequencing of methicil-
lin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus isolates. T. G. C. and R. A. S. analyzed 
the whole-genome sequencing data; M. D. P. and M. D. contributed to the 
analysis of these data. O. T. A., R. B., N. D., and T. K. collated and assem-
bled the study metadata. O. T. A. conducted the combined epidemiological 
analysis of single-nucleotide polymorphism-based clusters and metadata. 
O. T. A., R. A. S., and J. A. O. wrote the first draft of the manuscript and all 
authors contributed to the final version. J. D. E., O. T. A., R. A. S., and T. G. 
C. had full access to all the data and take responsibility for data integrity and 
accuracy of the analysis. J. D. E., O. T. A., R. A. S., and T. G. C. had full access 
to all the data in the study and had final responsibility for the decision to 
submit for publication.
Acknowledgments. We thank Amita Patel for coordination of isolate 
collection at participant sites and microbiological confirmation of MRSA at 
the Centre of Clinical Infection and Diagnostics Research.
Disclaimer. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and 
analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript. 
Financial support. This research was funded/supported by the 
National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Biomedical Research Centre 
based at Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Foundation Trust and King’s College 
London, program of Infection and Immunity (RJ112/N027) and the NIHR 
Collaboration for Leadership in Applied Health Research and Care South 
London at King’s College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust (to J. D. E.). M. D. 
P. was supported by the Medical Research Council UK (grant numbers MR/
K000551/1) T. G. C. also receives funding from the Medical Research Council 
UK (grant numbers MR/K000551/1, MR/M01360X/1, and MR/N010469/1). 
J. A. O. acknowledges support from the NIHR Health Protection Research 
Unit in Healthcare-Associated Infections and Antimicrobial Resistance at 
Imperial College London in partnership with Public Health England, and 
the Imperial College Healthcare Trust NIHR Biomedical Research Centre.
Potential conflicts of interest. J.  A. O.  is a consultant to Gama 
Healthcare Ltd. All other authors report no potential conflicts. All authors 
have submitted the ICMJE Form for Disclosure of Potential Conflicts of 
Interest. Conflicts that the editors consider relevant to the content of the 
manuscript have been disclosed.
References
1. de Kraker ME, Jarlier V, Monen JC, Heuer OE, van de Sande N, Grundmann 
H. The changing epidemiology of bacteraemias in Europe: trends from the 
European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System. Clin Microbiol Infect 
2013; 19:860–8.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/cid/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/cid/cix901/4571833
by London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine user
on 04 January 2018
 • CID 2017:XX (XX XXXX) • 9MRSA Transmission and Patient Sharing
2. Duerden B, Fry C, Johnson AP, Wilcox MH. The control of methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus blood stream infections in England. Open Forum Infect 
Dis 2015; 2:ofv035.
3. Price JR, Cole K, Bexley A, et al; Modernising Medical Microbiology infor-
matics group. Transmission of Staphylococcus aureus between health-care 
workers, the environment, and patients in an intensive care unit: a longitudi-
nal cohort study based on whole-genome sequencing. Lancet Infect Dis 2017; 
17:207–14.
4. Price JR, Golubchik T, Cole K, et  al. Whole-genome sequencing shows that 
patient-to-patient transmission rarely accounts for acquisition of Staphylococcus 
aureus in an intensive care unit. Clin Infect Dis 2014; 58:609–18.
5. Török ME, Harris SR, Cartwright EJ, et  al. Zero tolerance for healthcare-as-
sociated MRSA bacteraemia: is it realistic? J Antimicrob Chemother 2014; 
69:2238–45.
6. Donker T, Henderson KL, Hopkins KL, et  al. The relative importance of large 
problems far away versus small problems closer to home: insights into limiting 
the spread of antimicrobial resistance in England. BMC Med 2017; 15:86.
7. Chang HH, Dordel J, Donker T, et al. Identifying the effect of patient sharing on 
between-hospital genetic differentiation of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus. Genome Med 2016; 8:18.
8. Donker T, Wallinga J, Grundmann H. Patient referral patterns and the spread 
of hospital-acquired infections through national health care networks. PLoS 
Comput Biol 2010; 6:e1000715.
9. Ke W, Huang SS, Hudson LO, et al. Patient sharing and population genetic struc-
ture of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 
2012; 109:6763–8.
10. Barnes SL, Harris AD, Golden BL, Wasil EA, Furuno JP. Contribution of inter-
facility patient movement to overall methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
prevalence levels. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2011; 32:1073–8.
11. Datta R, Brown S, Nguyen VQ, et  al. Quantifying the exposure to antibi-
otic-resistant pathogens among patients discharged from a single hospital 
across all California healthcare facilities. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2015; 
36:1275–82.
12. Lee BY, Bartsch SM, Wong KF, et  al. The importance of nursing homes in the 
spread of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) among hospitals. 
Med Care 2013; 51:205–15.
13. Simmering JE, Polgreen LA, Campbell DR, Cavanaugh JE, Polgreen PM. Hospital 
transfer network structure as a risk factor for Clostridium difficile infection. Infect 
Control Hosp Epidemiol 2015; 36:1031–7.
14. Slayton RB, Toth D, Lee BY, et al. Vital signs: estimated effects of a coordinated 
approach for action to reduce antibiotic-resistant infections in health care facili-
ties—United States. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2015; 64:826–31.
15. Lee BY, Bartsch SM, Wong KF, et al. Simulation shows hospitals that cooperate 
on infection control obtain better results than hospitals acting alone. Health Aff 
2012; 31:2295–303.
16. Hughes J, Stabler R, Gaunt M, et al. Clonal variation in high- and low-level pheno-
typic and genotypic mupirocin resistance of MRSA isolates in south-east London. 
J Antimicrob Chemother 2015; 70:3191–9.
17. Tosas Auguet O, Betley JR, Stabler RA, et al. Evidence for community trans-
mission of community-associated but not health-care-associated methi-
cillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus strains linked to social and material 
deprivation: spatial analysis of cross-sectional data. PLoS Med 2016; 
13:e1001944.
18. Office for National Statistics. UK data service census support. Office for National 
Statistics, 2011 census: aggregate data (England and Wales). Downloaded from: 
http://infuse.mimas.ac.uk. Available at: http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/
open-government-licence/version/2. Accessed 6 January 2016.
19. Office for National Statistics. UK data service census support. Office for National 
Statistics. GeoConvert. Available at: http://geoconvert.mimas.ac.uk/. Accessed 22 
May 2016.
20. Li H, Durbin R. Fast and accurate short read alignment with Burrows-Wheeler 
transform. Bioinformatics 2009; 25:1754–60.
21. Holden MT, Hsu LY, Kurt K, et al. A genomic portrait of the emergence, evolu-
tion, and global spread of a methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus pandemic. 
Genome Res 2013; 23:653–64.
22. Li H, Handsaker B, Wysoker A, et  al; 1000 Genome Project Data Processing 
Subgroup. The sequence alignment/map format and SAMtools. Bioinformatics 
2009; 25:2078–9.
23. Coll F, McNerney R, Guerra-Assunção JA, et al. A robust SNP barcode for typing 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis complex strains. Nat Commun 2014; 5:4812.
24. Harris SR, Feil EJ, Holden MT, et al. Evolution of MRSA during hospital transmis-
sion and intercontinental spread. Science 2010; 327:469–74.
25. Stamatakis A. RAxML version 8: a tool for phylogenetic analysis and post-analysis 
of large phylogenies. Bioinformatics 2014; 30:1312–3.
26. Sanford MD, Widmer AF, Bale MJ, Jones RN, Wenzel RP. Efficient detection and 
long-term persistence of the carriage of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aur-
eus. Clin Infect Dis 1994; 19:1123–8.
27. Scanvic A, Denic L, Gaillon S, Giry P, Andremont A, Lucet JC. Duration of colon-
ization by methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus after hospital discharge and 
risk factors for prolonged carriage. Clin Infect Dis 2001; 32:1393–8.
28. Marschall J, Mühlemann K. Duration of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus carriage, according to risk factors for acquisition. Infect Control Hosp 
Epidemiol 2006; 27:1206–12.
29. Mattner F, Biertz F, Ziesing S, Gastmeier P, Chaberny IF. Long-term persistence of 
MRSA in re-admitted patients. Infection 2010; 38:363–71.
30. Sai N, Laurent C, Strale H, Denis O, Byl B. Efficacy of the decolonization of methi-
cillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus carriers in clinical practice. Antimicrob 
Resist Infect Control 2015; 4:56.
31. Donker T, Bosch T, Ypma RJ, et  al. Monitoring the spread of meticillin-resist-
ant Staphylococcus aureus in The Netherlands from a reference laboratory 
 perspective. J Hosp Infect 2016; 93:366–74.
32. van Duin D, Perez F, Rudin SD, et  al. Surveillance of carbapenem-resistant 
Klebsiella pneumoniae: tracking molecular epidemiology and outcomes through a 
regional network. Antimicrob Agents Chemother 2014; 58:4035–41.
33. Laxminarayan R. Crafting a system-wide response to healthcare-associated infec-
tions. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2012; 109:6364–5.
34. UK Department of Health. Implementation of modified admission MRSA screen-
ing guidance for NHS. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/345144/Implementation_of_modified_
admission_MRSA_screening_guidance_for_NHS.pdf. Accessed 25 August 2017.
35. Kumar N, Miyajima F, He M, et  al. Genome-based infection tracking reveals 
dynamics of Clostridium difficile transmission and disease recurrence. Clin Infect 
Dis 2016; 62:746–52.
36. Worby CJ, Lipsitch M, Hanage WP. Within-host bacterial diversity hinders accur-
ate reconstruction of transmission networks from genomic distance data. PLoS 
Comput Biol 2014; 10:e1003549.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/cid/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/cid/cix901/4571833
by London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine user
on 04 January 2018
